Emergent processes in cognitive-emotional interactions by Pessoa, Luiz
century of neuroscience research has yielded
evolving views of the organization of the brain in gen-
eral, and of how emotion and cognition are instantiated
in gray matter in particular. Proposals highlighting the
importance of specific regions, including the hypothal-
amus and the amygdala, as well as proposals describing
elaborate circuits, such as those by Papez and MacLean,
have been advanced. It is undeniable that certain brain
regions play an important role in emotion. Yet, it is also
apparent that they do not work in isolation and, instead,
participate in distributed networks of regions that, col-
lectively, carry out important functions. From both a
basic and clinical perspective, an especially challenging
problem is to understand the relationship between brain
networks that are important for perception and cogni-
tion, and those that determine the affective value of
stimuli and contexts. In this review, the interactive and
integrative potential that exists in the brain to bring
together the cognitive and emotional domains will be
highlighted. Because the backbone for these interactions
is anatomical, the first section will describe several exam-
ples of how the transfer of information takes place. The
second section illustrates some examples of the interac-
tion between perception and emotion, and between cog-
nition and emotion. The final section presents consider-
ations of how to conceptualize cognitive-emotional
interactions in terms of perceptual and cognitive com-
petition mechanisms.
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Emotion and cognition have been viewed as largely sep-
arate entities in the brain. Within this framework, signif-
icant progress has been made in understanding specific
aspects of behavior. Research in the past two decades,
however, has started to paint a different picture of brain
organization, one in which network interactions are key
to understanding complex behaviors. From both basic
and clinical perspectives, the characterization of cogni-
tive-emotional interactions constitutes a fundamental
issue in the investigation of the mind and brain. This
review will highlight the interactive and integrative
potential that exists in the brain to bring together the
cognitive and emotional domains. First, anatomical evi-
dence will be provided, focusing on structures such as
hypothalamus, basal forebrain, amygdala, cingulate cor-
tex, orbitofrontal cortex, and insula. Data on functional
interactions will then be discussed, followed by a discus-
sion of a dual competition framework, which describes
cognitive-emotional interactions in terms of perceptual
and cognitive competition mechanisms.  
© 2010, LLS SAS Dialogues Clin Neurosci. 2010;12:433-448.
PAGES_11_AG_1039_BA.qxd:DCNS#45  3/12/10  12:15  Page 433Anatomical substrates for 
cognitive-emotional interactions
This section describes how the architecture of the brain
includes multiple avenues for information integration.
As described, the substrates for information interaction
and integration are plentiful and provide the potential
for the coordinated flow of information that character-
izes complex behaviors.
Hypothalamus
The importance of the hypothalamus in certain aspects
of emotion is well known, as highlighted by the work of
Cannon and Bard; the latter showed via “decortication”
experiments that emotional expression effects were
abolished when the hypothalamus was eliminated, but
not when only the neocortex was compromised. Since
the 1920s and 1930s our knowledge of hypothalamic
function has been greatly extended and refined, and cur-
rent understanding concurs with the earlier notion that
the hypothalamus is involved in several important sur-
vival-related functions. To coordinate these functions, the
hypothalamus works in association with a multitude of
other sites in the brain stem and spinal cord. 
Historically, the role of the hypothalamus has often been
conceptualized as “descending,” a view that is summa-
rized in the designation of the hypothalamus as the
“head ganglion” of the autonomic nervous system. The
importance of the hypothalamus for descending control
notwithstanding, a recently recognized fact is the recog-
nition that the cerebral cortex and hypothalamus share
massive bidirectional connections. In the rat, which con-
stitutes the best studied case, there are four major routes
from the hypothalamus to the cerebral cortex (Figure
1).
1 These include a major direct projection to all parts
of the cortical mantle, and three indirect routes by way
of the thalamus, basal nuclei (specifically, magnocellular
basal forebrain and amygdala), and brain stem (see ref
1 for discussion of the indirect routes).
The direct input to the cortical mantle appears to be the
largest source of nonthalamic input to the cortex.
1,2 In
the rat, some important targets include infralimbic, pre-
limbic, anterior cingulate, and insular cortices.
Interestingly, projections to the lateral prefrontal cortex
are also found, and even to primary sensory areas
(though both are less prominent). An important indirect
system connects the hypothalamus to the cortex via the
magnocellular basal forebrain system. Another note-
worthy route to the cortex involves several amygdala
nuclei, including projections via the basolateral nucleus
that reach cingulate, motor, and visual areas. The orga-
nization of the connections between prefrontal cortex
and hypothalamus has been investigated in nonhuman
primates, too, and are in close concordance with the find-
ings in rats.
3 Notably, all prefrontal areas investigated
received projections from the hypothalamus. In addition
to the systems linking the hypothalamus to cortex, con-
versely, major telencephalic projections to the hypo-
thalamus also exist, including those from the hippocam-
pal formation, amygdala, insular cortex, and prefrontal
cortex.
In summary, whereas the hypothalamus is involved in a
host of basic control functions, it is part of an extensive
bidirectional connective system with cortex and many
other subcortical structures, in a manner that allows for
extensive integration of cognitive and emotional infor-
mation. Critically, the hypothalamus is linked to other
structures that have themselves widespread connectiv-
ity, including the magnocellular basal forebrain and the
amygdala.
Basal forebrain
The basal forebrain is a heterogeneous set of structures
close to the medial and ventral surfaces of the cerebral
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Figure 1. Hypothalamic ascending connectivity. Summary of the four
major pathways from the hypothalamus to the cerebral cor-
tex schematized on a flattened representation of the rat brain.
The basal ganglia here refer to the magnocellular basal fore-
brain and the amygdala complex. Note that one of the indi-
rect connections first “descends” to the brain stem. BG, basal
ganglia; BS, brain stem; CTX, cortex; HY, hypothalamus; TH,
thalamus. 
Adapted from ref 1: Risold PY, Thompson RH, Swanson LW. The struc-
tural organization of connections between hypothalamus and cerebral
cortex. Brain Res Brain Res Rev. 1997;24:197-254. Copyright © Elsevier,
1997
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is a prominent feature of the primate basal forebrain,
involving a continuous collection of large neurons that
involve the basal nucleus of Meynert (sometimes called
“substantia innominata”), and cell groups within the sep-
tum and the horizontal limb of the diagonal band. The
magnocellular basal forebrain system originates an
“ascending” (ie, corticopetal) cholinergic and γ-aminobu-
tyric acid (GABA)-ergic projection system that inner-
vates throughout the cortical mantle. Major projections
reach several cortical areas, including peristriate, infer-
otemporal, superior temporal, parahippocampal, tem-
poropolar, posterior parietal, cingulate, frontoparietal
opercular, lateral prefrontal, and orbitoinsular regions.
4
Extensive projections are also found to both the hip-
pocampus and amygdala.
5 An important pattern of this
projection system is that a connectivity gradient can be
identified, such that the densest projections from the
basal forebrain to cortex are found for nonisocortical
components of temporopolar, insular, and orbitofrontal
cortices
5 (where isocortical typically refers to cortex with
six identifiable layers). This pattern is consistent with the
dense innervations (stronger than cortex) observed for
both the hippocampus and amygdala, two regions with
simplified cytoarchitecture (ie, pattern of laminar struc-
ture).
Given its overall connectivity pattern, the magnocellu-
lar basal forebrain system is in a favorable position to
influence cortical sites across the brain, including sen-
sory cortex, and thus to influence the flow of informa-
tion processing. These distributed effects result in
increased vigilance, alertness, and attention, and more
generally have the potential for widespread impact on
cognitive function both in health and mental illness.
6,7
As with other neurotransmitter systems in the brain, the
effects of the magnocellular system are at times
described as relatively global, or at least unspecific.
However, specific effects have also been documented.
For instance, visual responses that are conveyed to pre-
frontal cortex engage the basal forebrain in a polysy-
naptic way, which then further enhances visual respond-
ing.
8 Direct stimulation of the basal forebrain also
enhances the cortical coding of natural scenes in visual
cortex by markedly improving the reliability of cell
responses.
9
Whereas the magnocellular system projects in a wide-
spread, distributed fashion to cortical and subcortical
regions, it is noteworthy that afferent fibers originate
from a much more circumscribed set of regions.
Cortically, inputs originate largely from nonisocortical
areas.
5,10 Given that these are exactly the regions that
receive the densest inputs from the basal forebrain,
potent basal forebrain-cortical circuits can be estab-
lished.
Amygdala
A remarkable property of the primate amygdala is its
massive interconnection with cortex. Based on the avail-
able data at the time, analysis of amygdala connectivity
revealed that this structure was connected to all but
eight of the cortical areas included in the study
11 (see
also refs 12,13). These connections involved multiple
region clusters, suggesting that the amygdala
14 is not only
one of the most highly connected regions of the brain,
but that its connectivity topology is consistent with that
of a “connector” hub
15 (where a hub is a region with a
high degree of connectivity) that links multiple “provin-
cial” hubs
15—where the latter refers to regions of dense
connectivity more closely associated with a specific func-
tional group, such as area V4 in visual cortex.
16 In this
manner, the amygdala has strong potential for integrat-
ing cognitive and emotional information.
17
When whole-brain connectivity data are analyzed, pre-
frontal areas are among those most distant from the sen-
sory periphery—based on the average number of con-
nections.
11 Thus, on average, the prefrontal cortex
receives highly processed and integrated sensory infor-
mation. This structural feature is thought to be impor-
tant because it provides the prefrontal cortex with rel-
ative insulation from the periphery. Indeed, this
organization has been proposed to be a key anatomical
feature of this region that may confer the primate brain
with a greater degree of flexibility.
4 Highly processed
information may also be important in supporting more
abstract processing that is required for cognition. It is
thus noteworthy that the amygdala (as well as other
regions, such as the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex)
was also found to be removed from the sensory periph-
ery,
11 indicating that this region is well situated to inte-
grating and distributing information, not unlike certain
prefrontal cortex territories.
Connections from the sensory periphery to the amyg-
dala that bypass the cortex have been documented, too.
For instance, in rodents, the medial geniculate body in
the thalamus conveys auditory information to the amyg-
Emergent processes in emotion and cognition - Pessoa Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience - Vol 12 . No. 4 . 2010
435
PAGES_11_AG_1039_BA.qxd:DCNS#45  3/12/10  12:15  Page 435dala and provides a “low road” (ie, subcortical pathway)
for auditory information.
18The potential role of subcor-
tical pathways conveying emotional information is dis-
cussed at length elsewhere. As described, in primates, it
is unlikely that fast, subcortical pathways play a promi-
nent role in affective visual processing.
19 Instead, it was
suggested that fast visual processing of affective stimuli
relies on multiple, parallel cortical pathways that rapidly
convey information to the amygdala and other evalua-
tive sites, such as the orbitofrontal cortex.
19,20
The pattern of connectivity between the amygdala and
prefrontal cortex
21 is of particular interest given the lat-
ter’s role in cognitive functions. In addition to substan-
tial connections between the amygdala and both medial
and orbital aspects of the prefrontal cortex, recent find-
ings indicate that the interconnection between the amyg-
dala and lateral prefrontal cortex extends throughout
the lateral surface.
22 Considered together, the connec-
tivity of the amygdala reveals a substrate for diverse cog-
nitive-emotional interactions that involves the main sec-
tors of the prefrontal cortex—though the anatomical
connectivity strength is markedly weaker in the case of
the lateral prefrontal cortex.
A further aspect of amygdala connectivity relates to the
visual cortex, an aspect that is critical in understanding
how amygdala signals modulate visual processing
according to an item’s affective significance. Information
from visual cortex reaches the amygdala from regions in
the anterior ventral visual system; specifically, responses
in inferior temporal cortex are conveyed to the lateral
and accessory basal nuclei.
23 In contrast, efferent pro-
jections from the amygdala are organized in a com-
pletely distinct manner and connect the basal nucleus of
the amygdala with nearly all levels of the ventral visual
pathway, including primary visual cortex.
24 Projections
from the amygdala to visual cortex terminate preferen-
tially in cortical layers I-II and V-VI (ie, not in layer IV),
a pattern that is typical of feedback-type connections
24
(eg, from V2 to V1). Typically, these connections are
unable to drive neuronal activity
25 (ie, independently
generate spiking outputs) but have the ability to mod-
ulate information processing by enhancing (or decreas-
ing) neural responses.
26
Patterns of amygdala connectivity without closely exam-
ining the different components of the amygdala complex
have been discussed. Yet, the connectivity pattern of the
central nucleus is quite distinct from the one observed
for regions such as the anterior basolateral and lateral
nuclei of the amygdala. The latter have been suggested
to be part of a frontotemporal association system, in con-
trast to the central nucleus, which is more directly linked
to autonomic structures.
27 More generally, when dis-
cussing the functions of the amygdala, it is thus impor-
tant to consider how distinct subregions of this structure
are anatomically connected.
Prefrontal monitoring and control of visceral and
other bodily functions
The idea that the prefrontal cortex is involved in the
control of the autonomic nervous system is not new, dat-
ing to the turn of the 20th century (see the historical
account by Neafsey
28). More recently, the tight interre-
lation between prefrontal cortex and bodily functions
was refined by the work of Damasio, Bechara, and col-
leagues on the somatic marker hypothesis (ie, the idea
that bodily states function as “marker” signals that influ-
ence reasoning and decision making), especially with
respect to the orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal
cortices.
29 Likewise, the notion that the anterior insula—
a region that is here discussed in conjunction with pre-
frontal sites—is involved in complex bodily representa-
tions, has gained visibility.
30-32
Cingulate cortex 
The functions of the cingulate cortex, which may com-
prise more than 30 to 40 subareas, are complex.
33 The
anterior sector of the cingulate gyrus is involved in a
broad array of functions, including willed action, exec-
utive functions, and emotion. A remarkable property of
this cortical tissue is that it probably has a more exten-
sive descending projection system than any other corti-
cal region,
34 including major projections to autonomic
regulatory structures, notably the lateral hypothalamus,
periaqueductal gray, parabrachial nucleus, and the
nucleus of the solitary tract.
35 This connectivity is con-
sistent with stimulation studies that have documented
effects of cingulate electrical stimulation on virtually all
autonomic and many endocrine functions.
33 Conversely,
a range of brain stem projections influence cingulate
responses.
36 These include projections from the locus
coeruleus to sites throughout the cingulate cortex, as
well as from the nucleus of the solitary tract. Several
nociceptive circuits also reach anterior- and mid-cingu-
late areas indirectly via thalamic nuclei. These findings
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is involved in the bidirectional integration of body-
related signals—this is true not only for more anterior
regions, but also for the posterior cingulate cortex. Given
the well-described roles of the cingulate cortex in cog-
nitive functions, this arrangement provides exceptional
opportunities for cognitive-emotional interaction and
integration.
Orbitofrontal cortex
Based on its connectivity pattern, the orbitofrontal cor-
tex can be divided into “orbital” and “medial” subcom-
ponents.
37The orbital network receives extensive sensory
information and appears to integrate it, particularly in
relation to the assessment of food and reward. The
medial network exhibits a distinctive connectivity pat-
tern, and is heavily connected with areas of the medial
wall of the brain, including those surrounding the cin-
gulate gyrus, as well as Brodmann areas 9 and 10 medi-
ally. Again in contrast to the orbital network, the medial
network receives few sensory inputs (with the exception
of auditory association areas). Importantly, it projects to
the hypothalamus and other visceral-control areas, lead-
ing to the suggestion that it is involved in “visceral mod-
ulation of emotion.”
38Via the hypothalamus, descending
medial orbitofrontal influence appears to extend as far
as spinal autonomic centers.
39 In contrast, there are rel-
atively few projections to the hypothalamus from the
orbital network.
Anterior insula
The anterior insula is another structure that is critically
involved in the processing of bodily signals as it contains
a visceral sensory cortex that maps the internal state of
the body in a precise fashion.
31,32 It has been suggested
31
that the anterior insula is more involved in the “afferent
representation of ‘feelings’ from the body” (including
representation of sensations such as temperature, pain,
and visceral ones; see also ref 30), and the cingulate, for
instance, is instead involved in the initiation of behaviors
(thus more “motor” in function).
More generally, when considering the connectivity of the
prefrontal cortex, more differentiated (in terms of lam-
inar structure) regions appear to have restricted con-
nections, whereas the least-differentiated regions have
widespread intrinsic connections.
40 For example, the
highly differentiated area 8 on the lateral surface has
connections that are more likely to target neighboring
regions on the lateral surface of the hemisphere. In con-
trast, both orbital and medial nonisocortical areas (ie,
areas with poor lamination structure, such as a conjoined
layer II/III and/or layer V/VI
41) have extensive connec-
tions that span the orbital, medial, and lateral surfaces
of the hemisphere. Thus, it has been suggested
40 that, on
the one hand, the widespread connectivity of the less dif-
ferentiated regions is consistent with a more “global
role” in neural processing; on the other hand, the more
differentiated regions may have more specific roles in
information processing.
Summary on anatomy
Historically, subcortical structures such as the hypothal-
amus and the amygdala have been implicated in emo-
tion. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that
their connectivity affords them great potential to inter-
act with many other cortical and subcortical structures
that are involved in cognitive functions. As noted in the
particularly prescient words by Amaral and Price in the
context of the amygdala
21: 
As our knowledge of the connections of the amygdala has
expanded, it has become apparent that the earlier view that
it is primarily involved in the control of visceral and auto-
nomic function is incomplete… These widespread inter-
connections with diverse parts of the brain simply do not
fit with a narrow functional role for the amygdaloid com-
plex. They support, rather, the behavioral and clinical
observations which suggest that the amygdaloid complex
should be included among the structures which are respon-
sible for the elaboration of higher cognitive functions” 
(p 492-493).
The understanding of the anatomy of the prefrontal cor-
tex has also evolved considerably. As described, large
sectors of the prefrontal cortex are strongly intercon-
nected with brain stem nuclei that are responsible for
controlling autonomic and endocrine function in the ser-
vice of supporting survival and bodily integrity via
homeostasis. The prefrontal and related sectors com-
prising the cingulate, orbitofrontal, and insula cortices
are also strongly interconnected. In addition, they are
also strongly interconnected with the amygdala. In all,
the vertical integration of information, both ascending
and descending, is implemented in an extensive manner.
Accordingly, in conceptualizing the function of the pre-
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links between parietal and prefrontal cortices) impor-
tant, but also vertical communication is of paramount
relevance. Finally, given that several prefrontal and insu-
lar areas contain less differentiated gray matter, their
widespread connectivity amplifies the potential for cog-
nitive-emotional interactions. 
Functional interactions between 
emotion and cognition
Having discussed anatomical substrates for communi-
cation, functional studies that, when combined with
anatomical evidence, further illustrate the interactions
between emotion and cognition, will now be described.
The examples will focus on interactions between emo-
tion and (i) perception and attention; and (ii) executive
functions (see also refs 20,30,42-45). 
Perception and attention 
Viewing emotion-laden visual stimuli is linked to height-
ened and more extensive visual system activation.
46,47 For
instance, viewing faces with emotional expressions
evokes increased responses relative to viewing neutral
faces throughout ventral occipitotemporal visual cortex.
Visual responses are also stronger when subjects view
emotional scenes (eg, a war scene) compared with neu-
tral scenes (eg, a lake scene). Increased visual activation
is observed in both “late” visual areas, such as the
fusiform gyrus and superior temporal sulcus, and “early”
visual cortex in the occipital lobe. Recent studies have
shown that, in humans, even retinotopically organized
visual cortex, including visual areas V1 and V2 along the
calcarine fissure, are modulated by the affective signifi-
cance of a stimulus.
48,49
Enhanced visual activation when viewing emotional
stimuli is consistent with observed improvements in
behavioral performance across several tasks. For
instance, there is some evidence that angry and happy
faces are detected faster in visual search tasks,
50 and pos-
sibly other emotional stimuli, too, such as a snake or spi-
der
51 (but see ref 52). Stronger evidence comes from
studies of the attentional blink paradigm, in which sub-
jects are asked to report the occurrence of two targets
(T1 and T2) among a rapid stream of visual stimuli.
When T2 follows T1 by a brief delay, participants are
more likely to miss it, as if they had blinked (hence the
name). The attentional blink, which is believed to reflect
a capacity-limited processing stage, has been shown to
be modulated by emotional stimuli, as subjects are sig-
nificantly better at detecting T2 when it is, for instance,
an emotion-laden word (eg, “rape”) than when it is a
neutral word.
53
Converging evidence for a link between perception,
attention, and emotion comes from additional studies.
For example, patients who present with unilateral inat-
tention due to spatial hemineglect (often as a result of
right hemisphere parietal lesions) are better at detecting
happy or angry faces compared with neutral ones.
54
These findings are consistent with the notion that emo-
tional faces may direct the allocation of attention. For
instance, in one study, emotional faces were flashed at
spatial locations that subsequently displayed low-con-
trast visual stimuli.
55 Subjects exhibited improved per-
formance for detecting targets shown at those locations,
suggesting that attention was deployed to them, thereby
facilitating visual detection (see also ref 48).
What are the mechanisms subserving the increase in per-
ceptual processing and attentional capture that are
observed during the perception of affective stimuli? Some
evidence links the amygdala with these effects. For
instance, patients with amygdala lesions do not exhibit
improved detection of T2 emotional targets during the
attentional blink (ie, do not show a decrease in the mag-
nitude of the blink),
56 and may not exhibit increased
responses in visual cortex during the viewing of fearful
faces
57 (but see ref 58 for evidence that the amygdala is
not required for at least some effects). Consistent with the
involvement of the amygdala, in a recent study of the
attentional blink, we observed that trial-by-trial fluctua-
tions of responses in the amygdala were predictive of
behavioral performance in the task—the greater the
evoked response, the higher the likelihood that the sub-
ject would correctly detect an emotional T2 stimulus.
59
Thus, it appears that the amygdala may underlie a form of
emotional modulation of information that in many ways
parallels attentional effects that are observed with non-
emotional information
47,60—the latter is thought to depend
on frontoparietal regions. As discussed in the previous
section, given that the amygdala sends projections across
nearly all levels of the visual system, it is well situated to
modulate sensory processing according to the affective
significance of a visual object (see also next section).
Is the perception of emotion-laden stimuli “automatic,”
namely independent of attention and awareness? This
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specific answers (“no” or “yes”) suggest potentially dif-
ferent relationships between emotion and cognition
(more or less independence between the two, respec-
tively). Evidence both for and against automaticity has
been presented. For instance, emotional faces evoke
responses in the amygdala when attention is diverted to
other stimuli.
61,62 Perhaps even more strikingly, amygdala
responses are sometimes observed for emotional faces
of which subjects are presumably not conscious.
63-65
Furthermore, cases of so-called affective blindsight have
been reported.
66These and other related findings suggest
that at least some types of emotional perception occur
outside of “cognitive” processing. Other findings have
suggested, however, that the perception of emotion-
laden items requires attention, as revealed by attentional
manipulations that were designed to more strongly con-
sume processing resources, leaving relatively few for the
processing of unattended emotional items.
67-73 It also
appears that amygdala responses evoked by “unaware”
stimuli depend on the manner by which awareness is
operationally defined,
74 such that unaware responses are
not observed when awareness is defined, for instance, via
signal detection theory methods.
75 Overall, the auto-
maticity debate remains unresolved and controver-
sial.
47,76-79
Executive functions
The impact of emotion on cognition is rich and varied
and has been documented in a range of tasks. This sec-
tion will briefly illustrate interactions involving two
executive functions. The first examples come from an
important dimension of cognitive function that includes
inhibiting and controlling behavior. Response inhibi-
tion, namely the processes required to cancel an
intended action, is believed to involve control regions
in medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, including pre-
supplementary motor cortex and inferior frontal gyrus.
80-82
Response inhibition is at times investigated by using so-
called go/no-go tasks in which subjects are asked to exe-
cute a motor response when shown the “go” stimulus
(eg, “press a key as fast as possible when you see a let-
ter stimulus”), but to withhold the response when
shown the “no-go” stimulus (eg, “do not respond when
you see the letter Y”). Typically, the go and no-go stim-
uli are shown as part of a rapid stream of stimuli (eg, a
sequence of letters). A recent study investigated the
interaction between the processing of emotional words
and response inhibition.
83 Response inhibition follow-
ing negative words (eg, “worthless”) engaged the dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (although behavioral effects
of emotional content were modest, further evidence
indicates that response inhibition behavior is affected
by stronger emotional stimuli
84). Interestingly, this
region was not recruited by negative valence or
inhibitory task demands per se; instead, the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex was sensitive to the interaction
between behavioral inhibition and the processing of
negatively valenced words, namely a cognitive-emo-
tional interaction. 
Working memory, another important cognitive function,
involves the maintenance and updating of information
in mind when the information is no longer available to
sensory systems. Evidence for cognitive-emotional inter-
action comes from working memory studies, too. For
instance, when participants were asked to keep in mind
neutral or emotional pictures, maintenance-related activ-
ity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was modulated by
the valence of the picture, with pleasant pictures enhanc-
ing activity and unpleasant pictures decreasing activity
relative to neutral ones.
85 Interestingly, emotional pic-
tures did not affect dorsolateral responses during a sec-
ond experimental condition during which participants
were not required to keep information in mind, indicat-
ing that the modulation of sustained activity by emo-
tional valence was particular to the experimental con-
text requiring active maintenance. In another study,
participants watched short videos intended to induce
emotional states (eg, clips from uplifting or sad movies),
after which they performed challenging working mem-
ory tasks.
86 Lateral prefrontal cortex activity on both
hemispheres equally reflected the emotional and work-
ing memory task components. In other words, prefrontal
activity did not stem from the working memory task
alone or by the mood ensuing from the viewing of the
video, but resulted from an interaction between emotion
and cognition.
In summary, these examples highlight the notion that
many of the effects of emotion on cognition are best
viewed as interactions between the two such that the
resulting processes and signals are neither purely cogni-
tive nor emotional. Instead, the “cognitive” or “emo-
tional” nature of the processes is blurred in a way that
highlights the integration of the two domains in the
brain.
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The last two sections described both anatomical and
functional evidence for the interaction between emotion
and cognition. How do these interactions influence the
flow of information processing in the brain?
14,43,87,88
Several proposals have been advanced in the literature,
focusing either on perceptual or cognitive processing.
Here, the discussion of the previous sections is extended
to further delineate how some of the brain regions dis-
cussed may contribute to cognitive-emotional interac-
tions. The presentation refines and extends a conceptual
framework described recently.
89 It was suggested that
both emotion and motivation signals are integrated with
perception and cognition so as to effectively incorporate
value into the unfolding of behavior. The proposed
framework was called the dual competition model to
reflect the suggestion that affective significance influ-
ences competition at both the perceptual and executive
levels (Figure 2)—and because the impact is due to both
emotion and motivation, although the latter is not dis-
cussed here (but see ref 90).
Objects compete for limited perceptual processing capac-
ity and control of behavior.
91,92 Because processing capac-
ity is limited, selective attention to one part of the visual
field comes at the cost of neglecting other parts. Thus, a
popular notion is that there is competition for neural
resources.
91,93As described below, to understand the flow
of information processing more generally, it is necessary
to go beyond the role of perceptual competition, and
explicitly incorporate the impact of executive control func-
tions on processing. Behavioral research supports the
notion that executive control is not unitary and that dif-
ferent mechanisms may have their own limited processing
capacities, or resources.
94,95 Neuropsychological research
also supports the dissociation of cognitive functions, con-
sistent with the “fractionation” of the central executive.
96,97
Yet, ample evidence suggests some unity of executive func-
tions, specifically that certain mechanisms are shared
across them.
98,99This capacity-sharing has important impli-
cations for the understanding of human information pro-
cessing because it leads to executive competition: sub-
components of executive control are mutually interacting,
such that resources devoted to one component will not be
available to other functions.
Perceptual competition
Perceptual competition, which takes place in visual cor-
tex, is affected by emotional content. As discussed, the
amygdala is well positioned to implement the enhance-
ment of visual activity given that its efferents reach mul-
tiple levels of the visual cortex, including primary visual
cortex.
23Although the role of the amygdala in the mod-
ulation of visual processing is often emphasized in the
literature, several other mechanisms likely play impor-
tant roles, too.
100 A second modulatory source may
involve the orbitofrontal cortex
20 (Figure 3A), a structure
that has important roles in the evaluation of sensory
stimuli.
101 The orbitofrontal cortex is reciprocally inter-
connected with visual cortex, especially the more ante-
rior portions of the ventral stream,
12,102 and is thus capa-
ble of influencing evoked responses in visual cortex
based on affective value.
A third important mechanism involves the basal fore-
brain (Figure 3A). The central nucleus of the amygdala
has significant projections to several basal forebrain
structures, and one mechanism by which the central
nucleus influences cortical processing is by engaging
magnocellular basal forebrain neurons (see refs
103,104), whose terminals release acetylcholine onto cor-
tical sensory neurons (GABAergic processes have also
been described). Lesions of the basal forebrain have
been shown to impair a host of attentional tasks, and
together with physiological studies, reveal the impor-
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Figure 2. Cognitive-emotional interactions. Affective value interacts
with both perceptual and executive processes.
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tion, but also for selective aspects of stimulus process-
ing, including the filtering of irrelevant information.
6,7
A final class of modulatory mechanisms relies on the
frontoparietal attentional network (Figure 3B), includ-
ing lateral prefrontal cortex, frontal eye field, and pari-
etal cortex, which modulate visual processing accord-
ing to an item’s behavioral relevance. These regions are
believed to be “control sites” that provide the source
of top-down attentional signals.
105,106 Importantly, both
frontal eye field and parietal cortex appear to contain
a “priority map,” namely a representation of spatial
locations containing information that is rich in terms of
salience (eg, high-contrast stimuli) and/or relevance
(eg, stimuli connected to current goals).
107,108 It is sug-
gested here that the frontoparietal network works
closely with several “evaluative” sites discussed in the
first section, such as hypothalamus, amygdala, cingulate
cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, and anterior insula, to pri-
oritize processing based on the affective significance of
a sensory stimulus (for a related discussion in the case
of motivation, see ref 90). In some of these cases, the
direct connections between “evaluative” and “control”
regions may be relatively weak, and indirect routes
involving one or more intermediate steps are probably
involved.
An additional modulatory role is proposed for the pul-
vinar complex of the thalamus (Figure 3B). Based on
anatomical and physiological considerations, it was sug-
gested that the importance of the pulvinar for affective
processing is not due to its putative role as part of a sub-
cortical pathway, as often assumed in the literature, but
instead because of its connectivity with other cortical
regions.
19 Briefly, the medial nucleus of the pulvinar,
which projects to the amygdala, is part of several thala-
mocortical loops that include orbitofrontal, cingulate,
and insular cortices (in addition to frontal and parietal
sites). Given this broad connectivity pattern, the medial
nucleus may be involved in two general functions that
directly impact emotional processing: determining
behavioral relevance and/or value. Therefore, the role of
the pulvinar may extend beyond the well-established
roles in attention
109 and contribute to affective process-
ing.
110-112
In summary, during the past decade, an important role
for the amygdala in the emotional modulation of vision
has been highlighted in the literature. Yet, as described
here, the amygdala is but one of the sources of modu-
lation of visual responses that take into consideration
the behavioral and affective significance of sensory
stimuli. Future research is needed to establish how
these multiple modulatory sources influence visual pro-
cessing in particular, and other sensory modalities more
generally.
Emergent processes in emotion and cognition - Pessoa Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience - Vol 12 . No. 4 . 2010
441
Figure 3. Interactions between emotion and perception. (A) Visual pro-
cessing is suggested to be modulated by affective value via
several mechanisms, including those involving projections
from the amygdala, basal forebrain, orbitofrontal cortex, and
possibly hypothalamus (not shown). (B) Another class of mod-
ulatory mechanisms relies on interactions between “evalua-
tive” sites (shown in color) and “control” sites (shown in
white), the latter located in frontoparietal cortex and known
to exert top-down influences on visual processing. Dotted
lines indicate possibly indirect connections. All locations are
approximate, and the positions of the amygdala, basal fore-
brain, hypothalamus, and pulvinar are shown on the lateral
surface for schematic purposes. A, amygdala; BF, basal fore-
brain; FEF, frontal eye field; Hyp, hypothalamus; IPS, intra-
parietal sulcus; OFC, orbitofrontal cortex; Pul, pulvinar. 
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How does emotional content impact executive function?
Because emotion can either enhance or impair perfor-
mance of executive functions, answering this question
has been challenging. At least part of the answer may be
related to the level of threat posed by an emotional item.
When threat content is relatively low, processing is
biased in favor of the emotional item and although emo-
tional items are prioritized, the impact on behavior may
be modest. Importantly, emotional content enhances
task-relevant processing with relatively minor effects on
irrelevant stimuli and other executive functions that may
be concurrently needed.
A more dramatic effect of emotional content on behavior
is expected when the level of threat is high. In this situa-
tion, processing resources are diverted toward the pro-
cessing of the item at hand and because the mobilization
of resources is more extreme, the effects on behavior are
considerably more dramatic.
113,114 In particular, the impact
on behavior may come from the recruitment of atten-
tional/effortful control that is required to prioritize the
processing of high-threat information. Attentional/effort-
ful control involves processing resources that are shared
across executive functions and because high threat is
expected to recruit some of these resources (see also refs
78,115,116), it will impair other executive functions that
are reliant on them (Figure 4). Consistent with this idea,
performance during response inhibition was compromised
when participants viewed high- vs low-arousing pictures.
84
In the past, the notion of resources has been employed
in order to account for the limits of human information
processing. A potential approach to understanding
resource consumption by threat may be to probe the cor-
respondence of brain sites that are sensitive to specific
experimental conditions. It is particularly instructive, for
instance, to examine the overlap between manipulations
of threat level and those involving attention – given that
attentional manipulations are sensitive to changes in the
distribution of processing resources. The “attentional net-
work” has been extensively researched and is believed to
involve frontoparietal regions, including the middle
frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cor-
tex, and anterior insula.
105,106To assess brain regions that
are sensitive to high levels of threat, the activation sites
of the contrast of CS+ (ie, aversively conditioned) vs. CS-
(ie, neutral) of 34 aversive conditioning studies were
reviewed. Although great emphasis is put on the involve-
ment of the amygdala in the processing of threat, this
summary revealed that several frontal activation sites
were consistently reported, including middle frontal
gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex, and
anterior insula.
89This evaluation thus suggests that pro-
cessing high-threat items engages key nodes of the atten-
tional network, suggesting that it consumes processing
resources.
What are some of the neural substrates of the interac-
tions between emotion and cognition? When items are
high in threat, robust interactions between affective pro-
cessing and executive functions are proposed to take
place via several neural mechanisms. First, it is hypoth-
esized that threat processing engages attentional/effort-
ful control mechanisms in several frontoparietal sites,
including lateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate
cortex, and parietal cortex. The role of the anterior cin-
gulate cortex may be particularly important because of
its role in integrating inputs from multiple sources,
including cognitive, affective and motivational inputs
117
(Figure 5). In cognitive studies, the anterior cingulate has
been suggested to be involved in conflict detection, error
likelihood processing, and error monitoring, among
other functions. Anterior cingulate engagement during
threat may impair executive function because shared
resources required to prioritize threat processing are
recruited. In other words, anterior cingulate sites
engaged by high-threat are at the intersection of the
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Figure 4. Executive competition and threat. Executive functions can be
viewed as relying on multiple mechanisms, also referred to as
resources (R1 through R4; eg, “shifting,” “updating”), that
are partly independent but, critically, are also shared (indicated
by the orange circle). When threat content is high, these
shared resources (SR) are engaged, thus detracting from the
ability to recruit specific mechanisms at optimal levels.
Consequently, behavioral performance relying on those mech-
anisms will be impaired.
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indicated by the orange region in Figure 4). Notably, the
anterior cingulate engagement includes the dorsal sec-
tor, in contrast to the idea that the dorsal anterior cin-
gulate is involved in cognitive function, in opposition to
the more rostral, “emotional” sector.
118
As discussed, the anterior insula is critical for interocep-
tion, which involves monitoring the sensations that are
important for the integrity of the internal body state, and
interacting with systems that are important for evaluat-
ing context, allocating attention, and planning actions.
119
Threat, uncertainty, and risk are all potent factors that
engage the anterior insula.
120 Remarkably, the anterior
insula also was found to be activated in most cognitive
tasks for which Van Snellenberg and Wager
121 had meta-
analytic data. The anterior insula is thus a site that is
engaged during both cognitive and emotional contexts
(Figure 5). Accordingly, recruitment of the anterior insula
during high-threat conditions will detract from its ability
to assist in executive functions; a concomitant impair-
ment in performance is thus expected. Note that this
argument assumes that the engagement of the anterior
insula during high-threat conditions substantially inter-
sects with cortical territories that are required for cogni-
tive processes (see “SR” in Figure 4). Naturally, these and
other aspects of the dual competition framework need to
be validated by experimental data. 
A second effect of threat is to trigger specific executive
functions to handle ongoing challenges to the organism.
For instance, “updating” might be needed to refresh the
contents of working memory, “shifting” might be
recruited to switch the current task set, and “inhibition”
could be called to cancel previously planned actions.
Again, this recruitment is suggested to depend, at least
in part, on the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior
insula—the former is known to influence activity in
other brain regions and to modulate cognitive, motor,
and visceral responses.
117 For instance, the anterior cin-
gulate may work in close cooperation with lateral pre-
frontal cortex (see also ref 122), a region that is impor-
tant for the manipulation of information, among other
functions. In this manner, additional specific processing
resources are coordinated in the service of threat pro-
cessing (Figure 5). Affective information conveyed by
other brain regions, including the hypothalamus, amyg-
dala, basal forebrain, and orbitofrontal cortex is con-
veyed (possibly indirectly) to lateral prefrontal cortex
and parietal sites, too, further engaging executive power
in the function of handling the threat to the organism. In
finalizing the discussion of the involvement of fronto-
parietal regions in interactions between emotion and
executive function, note that these are some of the same
regions that were implicated as having an important
effect on perceptual competition (Figure 3B), highlight-
ing the interdependence of perceptual and executive
processes—in other words, the sharp distinction between
bottom-up and top-down in Figure 2 is artificial. 
A third effect of threat on executive functions involves
state changes that are implemented via ascending sys-
tems.
7,123 The basal forebrain, hypothalamus, and reticu-
lar formation have the ability to influence both cortical
and subcortical processing via widespread projections.
In particular, the overall anatomical arrangement of the
basal forebrain (here, more broadly construed) might
involve multiple functional–anatomical macrosys-
tems
124,125 with wide-ranging effects on brain computa-
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Figure 5. Interactions between emotion and cognition. The anterior
insula and the anterior cingulate cortex are important sites
involved in determining affective significance and value. In so
doing, they are closely affiliated with an extended set of
regions, some of which are shown here in the orange ellipse.
The anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex interact
closely with the lateral prefrontal cortex, a region involved in
several cognitive functions. In this manner, cognitive-emo-
tional interactions occur during complex behaviors. Notably,
these interactions can be either beneficial or detrimental to
behavior. In the latter case, for instance, when threat level is
high, resources required for cognitive operations are partly
consumed, thereby compromising behavioral performance.
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; Amyg, amygdala; Ant insula,
anterior insula; BF, basal forebrain; Hyp, hypothalamus; LPFC,
lateral prefrontal cortex.
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6,14,124 More gen-
erally, the three structures may be viewed as key com-
ponents of the “behavioral state system,” which has been
suggested to be one of the major functional subsystems
of the vertebrate nervous system
126 (together with “cog-
nitive,” “sensory,” and “motor” systems).
Conclusions
Historically, emotion and cognition have been viewed as
largely separate entities. One way in which emotion has
been contrasted with cognition has been to link the for-
mer with “irrational” or “suboptimal” processes
127 that
are more “basic,” namely more linked to survival, than
cognitive ones. Although much has changed in the past
two decades, versions of this viewpoint still are quite fre-
quent in the literature (even if, at times, implicitly).
Research in the past decades suggests, however, that such
view is likely erroneous and that, in order to understand
how complex behaviors are carried out in the brain, an
understanding of the interactions between the two is
indispensable. Interestingly, neuroimaging in humans
may have been one factor contributing to the change in
this viewpoint. Because neuroimaging techniques afford
whole-brain investigations, it has become increasingly
evident that large portions of both cortex and subcortex
are engaged during emotional information analyses.
128
In many current formulations of how emotion is organized
in the brain, a heavy emphasis is found on “special”
regions, most notably, the amygdala. In particular, it could
be argued that the amygdala is “primitive” (in the sense of
being derived from ancestral form), and that it may be bet-
ter viewed as tied to fear-related functions and as an effec-
tive “alarm system”—one that has been evolutionarily
conserved for good reasons. Yet, even in rodents impor-
tant roles for the amygdala in “cognitive” operations, such
as attention and decision making, have been docu-
mented.
129,130And in primates, as pointed out by Sander and
colleagues, the amygdala may have evolved into a less spe-
cialized system in order to cope with new environmental
problems.
131 One way in which this may have occurred may
be related to an expansion of the connectivity of the amyg-
dala with a wider range of cortical territories.
132This may
involve new direct connections, such as the connectivity
documented between the amygdala and lateral prefrontal
cortex
22 and, more extensively, indirect connections via
other important cortical hubs, such as those involving the
anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal, and insular cortices.
Altered and enhanced connectivity may be one way in
which a system expands the repertoire of functions it is
involved in. Although the evolution of the brain is highly
constrained, dramatic changes in the pattern of connec-
tivity have been documented—such as those involving the
somatosensory cortex and thalamus in several mam-
mals.
133,134 Furthermore, whereas mice have about 10 corti-
cal fields, and macaque monkeys have more than 50 fields,
humans may have more than a hundred fields.
134The com-
binatorial nature of connectivity is such that, in humans,
the amygdala, which is extremely highly interconnected,
as reviewed here, may be in a position to be an important
player in an impressive array of cognitive-emotional func-
tions.
Generally speaking, given the combinatorial connectiv-
ity of the brain, it will be important to go beyond simply
describing interactions between emotion and cognition,
some of which are suggested to be mutually antagonis-
tic.
135 Instead, future advances will be made by the mech-
anistic description of how cognition and emotion are
effectively integrated in the brain. This is especially per-
tinent in light of the suggestion that in many cases func-
tional specialization is lost, and emotion and cognition
conjointly and equally contribute to the control of men-
tal activities and behavior.
86 For instance, the affective
dimensions of a visual item are reflected at multiple pro-
cessing stages, from early visual areas to prefrontal
sites.
136 In addition, visual cortical responses reflecting an
item’s significance will be a result of simultaneous top-
down modulation from frontoparietal attentional
regions and emotional modulation from the amygdala,
basal forebrain, orbitofrontal cortex, and other regions.
This perspective can also be adopted in the context of
executive functioning, such that cognitive and emotional
contributions to executive control are difficult to sepa-
rate. For example, lateral prefrontal cortex signals
involved in inhibitory processes may reflect both cogni-
tive variables (eg, an inhibitory response is required) and
affective information (eg, negative stimuli are viewed
before being required to inhibit a response). A key
implication of the integration viewpoint is that, in gen-
eral, it may be simply counterproductive to attempt to
separate emotion and cognition. Instead, their interde-
pendence challenges a simple division into separate
“cognitive” and “emotional” domains.
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Procesos emergentes en las interacciones
cognitivo-emocionales
La emoción y la cognición se han considerado como
entidades ampliamente separadas en el cerebro.
Dentro de este sistema, se ha realizado un progreso
significativo en la comprensión de aspectos espe-
cíficos de la conducta. Sin embargo, la investigación
en las últimas dos décadas ha comenzado a bos-
quejar un cuadro diferente de la organización cere-
bral, entre  las cuales las interacciones en redes son
clave para comprender las conductas complejas.
Tanto desde la perspectiva básica como clínica, la
caracterización de las interacciones cognitivo-emo-
cionales constituye un tema fundamental en la
investigación de la mente y el cerebro. Esta revisión
destacará el potencial interactivo e integrador que
existe en el cerebro para reunir los aspectos cogni-
tivos y emocionales. Primero se entregará la evi-
dencia anatómica, focalizada en estructuras como
el hipotálamo, el cerebro anterior basal, la amíg-
dala, la corteza cingulada, la corteza órbito-frontal
y la ínsula. Luego se discutirán datos acerca de las
interacciones funcionales, seguidos del análisis de
un sistema dual competitivo que describe las inte-
racciones cognitivo-emocionales en términos de
mecanismos de competencia perceptivos y cogniti-
vos.  
Interactions cognitivo-émotionnelles : 
les processus émergents
L’émotion et la cognition ont été considérées
comme des entités complètement séparées dans le
cerveau. Dans ce contexte, la compréhension des
aspects spécifiques du comportement a fait des pro-
grès significatifs. Cependant, la recherche de ces 20
dernières années a commencé à décrire un autre
tableau de l’organisation cérébrale, dans laquelle
les interactions du réseau sont la clé de la compré-
hension des comportements complexes. Que les
perspectives soient fondamentales ou cliniques, la
description des interactions cognitivo-comporte-
mentales constitue une question centrale de la
recherche sur la pensée et le cerveau. Cet article
soulignera le potentiel interactif et intégratif du
cerveau afin de réconcilier les domaines cognitif et
émotionnel. Nous fournirons d’abord des argu-
ments anatomiques, en insistant sur les structures
comme l’hypothalamus, le prosencéphale, l’amyg-
dale, le cortex cingulaire, le cortex orbitofrontal et
l’insula. Nous analyserons ensuite les données des
interactions fonctionnelles, puis nous étudierons le
double cadre compétitif, qui décrit les interactions
cognitivo-émotionnelles en termes de mécanismes
rivaux de perception et de cognition.
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